How Serpentine Districts Became Law: Michigan Redistricting in 2011 by Benson, Jocelyn
Wayne State University
Law Faculty Research Publications Law School
1-1-2011
How Serpentine Districts Became Law: Michigan
Redistricting in 2011
Jocelyn Benson
Wayne State University
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at DigitalCommons@WayneState. It has been accepted for inclusion in Law
Faculty Research Publications by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@WayneState.
Recommended Citation
Jocelyn Benson, How Serpentine Districts Became Law: Michigan Redistricting in 2011, 13 J.L. Soc'y 7, 22 (2011)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.wayne.edu/lawfrp/271
HOW SERPENTINE DISTRICTS BECAME LAW:
MICHIGAN REDISTRICTING IN 2011
JOCELYN BENSON'
Table of Contents
I. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................. 7
II. THE POLITICS OF REDISTRICTING IN MICHIGAN IN 2011 ..................... 9
III. THE LAW OF REDISTRICTING IN 2011 ........................................... 13
IV. AN OPPORTUNITY FOR REFORM: A CITIZENS' REDISTRICTING
C OM M ISSION .................................................................................. 17
V . CONCLUSION .................................................................................. 21
I. INTRODUCTION
In July 2011, the Michigan legislature enacted a plan for new
congressional districts that could arguably be the most oddly-shaped
district maps in Michigan's history, with districts swirling around
Southeast Michigan like "colors in a Willy Wonka lollipop."
2
As the below illustration demonstrates, the new 9th, 11 th, and 14th
congressional districts for Michigan are three of the most awkwardly
shaped districts that Michigan has ever seen. The new 9th District, is
shaped like a Leprechaun's shoe, heeled in Roseville and Eastpointe and
curling up around Birmingham to capture Bloomfield Township. The
11 th grew a tail that wraps around Pontiac to reach Birmingham. And,
the serpentine shape of the 14th Congressional District groups voters in
Southwest Detroit and Grosse Pointe with residents of West Bloomfield
and Pontiac.
1. Associate Professor of Law, Wayne State University Law School. B.A. Wellesley
College, M.Phil, Oxford University, J.D. Harvard Law School. I am grateful for the
suggestions and comments provided in the formulation of this article. All errors and
omissions are my own.
2. See Jo Mathis, Asked and Answered: Jocelyn Benson, DET. LEGAL NEWS, Aug.
18, 2011, http://www.legalnews.com/detroit/1044313; see also Jack Lessenberry, The
Topsy-Turvy World of Michigan Politics, WINDSOR STAR (Can.), Oct. 18, 2011 (referring
to the map as "the most oddly gerrymandered congressional districts in state history").
3. See MICH. STATE S., CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT MAP 3 (2011) [hereinafter
CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT MAP], available at http://www.senate.mi.gov/reapportion
ment/Proposed%20Congressional%20Plan.pdf.
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Figure 1. Congressional districts of Southeast Michigan (see note 3).
Michigan is not the only state in the country where the 2011
redistricting cycle yielded several questionable new districts. The
national political journal Roll Call suggested that nationally, this
redistricting cycle was "particularly ugly and hypocritical" - perhaps the
"ugliest" ever.4 The newspaper pointed to Michigan's very own,
increasingly infamous, 14th Congressional district, as one of the top five
most partisan, "ugliest" districts.5 Roll Call considers the district, dubbed
the "8 Mile Mess," on a level of irregularity with Maryland's contorted
3rd District, the "Pinwheel of Death," and Ohio's 9th - the "Mistake by
the Lake."6
4. Stuart Rothenberg, Is This the Ugliest Redistricting Cycle Ever? ROLL CALL, Nov.
18, 2011, http://www.rollcall.com/issues/57_57/is this ugliest redistricting cycle-ever-
210186-1.html.
5. Shira Toeplitz, Top 5 Ugliest Districts: Partisan Gerrymandering 101, ROLL
CALL, Nov. 10, 2011, http://www.rollcall.com/features/Election-Preview 201 1/election
/top-5-ugliest-districts-210224-1 .html.
6. Id.
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The map's defenders claim that Section 2 of the federal Voting
Rights Act 7 (VRA) compelled them to draw such bizarrely shaped
districts.8 VRA is widely interpreted to require Michigan to maintain two
congressional districts where African Americans comprise over fifty
percent of the voting population. 9
Critics have argued that this requirement in no way required the
creation of such contorted districts. As evidence, they point to a wide
array of alternative maps - including one drawn by the president of the
College Republicans at Central Michigan University"' - that meet VRA
standards with compact districts that also guarantee population
heavyweights, like Oakland County, the opportunity to send one of its
own residents to Congress.
This article will review the legal arguments and political realities that
envelop the 2011 Michigan Congressional District Maps. Part II delves
into the political realities and partisan context that influenced and in
many ways drove the redistricting process. Part I provides an overview
of the state and federal legal requirements for the Congressional districts
and the ways in which the new Congressional map fits within those
requirements, noting the fact that the maps will likely escape serious
legal scrutiny. Part IV reviews some of the reforms proposed to change
the redistricting process in 2011 and suggests the creation of an
Independent Redistricting Commission in Michigan to ensure that future
efforts to redraw Michigan's Congressional districts are in line with the
interests of the state's citizens.
II. THE POLITICS OF REDISTRICTING IN MICHIGAN IN 2011
In December 2010, the United States Census Bureau announced that
Michigan would be one of ten states losing a seat in the U.S. Congress
7. Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (2006).
8. See, e.g., Chad Selweski, GOP Map Puts Reps. Levin, Peters in Same District,
MACOMB DAILY, June 17, 2011, http://www.macombdaily.com/articles/2011/06/17/
news/doc4dfb8bb61 ee2e847785542.txt.
9. See Presentation Concerning Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act Before the H.
Comm. on Redistricting, 96th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2011) (testimony of Melvin Butch
Hollowell, Legal Counsel, Michigan Legislative Black Caucus) [hereinafter Testimony of
Melvin Hollowell], available at http:/ihouse.michigan.gov/SessionDocs/2011-2012/
Testimony/Committee7-4-26-2011 .pdf, see also, e.g., Thomburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30,
50-51 (1986); Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 157 (1993); Growe v. Emison, 507
U.S. 25, 40 (1993).
10. Chad Selweski, College Kid Shows up Legislators on Redistricting, MACOMB
DAILY, June 24, 2011, http://macombpolitics.blogspot.com/2011/06/college-kid-shows-
up-legislators-on.html.
2011]
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based on population shifts around the country." As a result, one thing
was certain even before the 2011 redistricting cycle began: at least one
member of the state's congressional delegation elected in 2010 would be
searching for a new job come January 2013.
The political debate, explicit or not, focused on that very question:
which current incumbent would be left without a district following the
reconfiguration of the map? '
2
With sizeable majorities in both houses in the state legislature and
the Governor's office, Republicans had complete control of the process.
It was therefore no surprise that a Democrat - Congressman Gary Peters
-represented the then soon to be eliminated district. Peters was relatively
young, moderate, and widely regarded to have a bright future." He was
first elected in 2008 as the first Democrat to represent Oakland County in
Congress in over a century. 14 In the new map, Peters' district is
eliminated and its voters parceled out into three neighboring districts.
Strong Republican areas of the district were folded into Republican
Thaddeus McCotter's District 11, and the Democratic areas of the district
are now part of areas currently represented by Democrats Sandy Levin
and John Conyers. 5
This effort to eliminate Peters' Democratic leaning district was one
of the political and partisan factors that drove the redistricting process in
2011. Two other factors also influenced the process.
The first is the political ambition of the current Congressional
delegation and the legislators drawing the maps. Those serving in
Congress are widely assumed to work behind closed doors with state
legislators to advocate for the best possible district in which to run for re-
election." To the term-limited state legislator, redistricting offers the
11. See KRISTEN BURNETT, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, C2010BR-08, CONGRESSIONAL
APPORTIONMENT 3 (2011). Other states, like Texas, gain up to four additional
congressional seats. Id.
12. See e.g., Peter Luke, Michigan Likely to Lose a Democrat in Congress under
Proposed New Congressional Map, MLivE.com (June 17, 2011, 1:04 PM),
http://www.mlive.com/politics/index.ssf/2011/06/michigan-likelytolose_a-demo.html.
13. See Lessenberry, supra note 2.
14. Id.; see also LEG. SERV. BUREAU, MICHIGAN MANUAL 2003-2004, at 606-24
(2004), http://www.legislature.mi.gov/%28S%28vmcacebxze5neiafwpv2uhea%29%29/
mileg.aspx?page=mm2003-2004.
15. Marisa Schultz, New 14th District: A Land of Opposites, DET. NEWS, Aug. 4,
2011, at Al (quoting political scientist John Chamberlin as commenting that the 14 th
Congressional District "is the ugliest district Michigan has had since they've started
doing redistricting" and noting that "[i]t's clearly tortured. Something is going on").
16. Rothenberg, supra note 4 (noting "sources close to the process," indicating that
Michigan Congressman Fred Upton "took a leading role in negotiating the new map with
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opportunity to draw his or her own future Congressional district. They
can, literally, choose which voters they would like to include in their
district. 17
Ten years ago, then-term limited state Senator Thaddeus McCotter
aspired to serve in Congress. As a legislator sitting on the committee
who drew the congressional district lines, future Congressman McCotter
was able to select and vote on the creation of a district where he would
later run a victorious campaign.18
This round it was widely believed that State Representative Marty
Knollenberg, who announced his candidacy for Congress while serving
on the House redistricting committee that commissioned the maps, was
seeking to repeat history by drawing himself into Congressional District
11.19 Knollenberg later withdrew from the race when Congressman
McCotter ended his campaign for the Presidency and indicated he would
be running for re-election in District 11.2°
The second factor is the larger effort by political parties to create
maps that produce strangely shaped noncompetitive districts in order to
ensure a pre-ordained partisan makeup in the state's Congressional
21delegation. When that happens, it's the citizens who play the price.
Voters are less motivated to participate in elections when their district's
partisan make-up predetermines the winner of the general election.
22
And, when the winner of the primary is able to safely sail to victory in
the general, politicians learn to win through playing to the partisan
extremists in their districts. Political rhetoric rises and moderates lose
out.
23
the governor and state legislators, with [Congressman Dave] Camp and fellow GOP Rep.
Candice Miller assisting").
17. For further commentary on the need for voters to choose their representatives,
"not the other way around," see, e.g., How to Rig an Election, ECONoMIST, Apr. 25, 2002,
http://www.economist.com/node/l099030.
18. David E. Rosenbaum, The 2002 Campaign: The House; Stark Differences Define
2 Candidates In A Close Race In Michigan, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 2002, at Al.
19. Charles Crumm, Knollenberg Plans to Run for Congress, OAKLAND PRESS, Mar.
30, 2011, http://theoaklandpress.com/articles/2011/03/30/news/politics/doc4d936b6eed9a
1528413092.txt?viewmode=fullstory.
20. Rothenberg, supra note 4 (affirming Knollenberg's hope to run for Congress in
the district but his decision to not "run against a Republican incumbent").
21. For data on the disenfranchising effects of noncompetitive districts, see SUSAN J.
DEMAS & JOHN BEBOW, CTR. FOR MICH., RE-DRAWING MICHIGAN (2011),
http://www.thecenterformichigan.net/wp-content/uploads/201 1/02/CFM redistricting_
report feb 201 1.pdf.
22. Id. at 7.
23. Id. at 9.
2011]
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Further, if districts are compact and communities preserved, voters
have greater influence over the person elected out of that district. But
districts drawn to maximize partisan advantage will likely divide local
communities into many districts. When communities are spread across
multiple districts, it becomes nearly impossible for neighbors to have
clout in any of them.
2 4
Michigan's 2011 Congressional district map reflects the presence of
both of these phenomena. The plan, which Michigan's Democratic
leaders referred to as "partisan hijacking, ' 25 spreads the state's
Republican voters across nine districts and packs nearly all of
Michigan's Democratic voters into the remaining five, only two of the
fourteen districts are competitive - with Republicans making up an
estimated fifty-three percent of the voting population.26 Christina Kuo,
executive director of nonpartisan Common Cause of Michigan, called the
map a partisan "sham," noting that "[t]he only beneficiaries of partisan-
gerrymandered districts are partisan political operatives and the wealthy
special interests they serve.27
While partisan and political influences dominated the 2011
redistricting process in Michigan, much of the public debate also circled
24. Justin Levitt, Weighing the Potential of Citizen Redistricting, 44 Loy. L.A. L.
REV. 513 (2011) (describing the importance of preserving communities of interest in the
redistricting process).
25. Peter Luke, State Democrats Want Public Input on District Maps, Redistricting
and Elections Committee Chief Defends Plan, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS (June 18, 2011); see
also Hearing on H.B. 4780 Before the S. Comm. on Redistricting, 96th Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Mich. 2011) (testimony of Mark Brewer, Chair, Michigan Democratic Party), available
at http://www.senate.michigan.gov/committees/files/2011 -SCT-REDIST-06-28-1-06.PDF.
In his testimony, Brewer states:
[t]here is not one district under the ... plan that is 50-50 in partisan make-up
when one reviews previous election results. It is clear they sought solely to
strengthen the partisan make-up for their Congressional Republican
incumbents. By reducing competitive districts, this plan disenfranchises not
only Democrats and Republicans but independent voters - by making partisan
primaries the key elections and making general elections irrelevant. Id. at 2.
26. Shira Toeplitz, Levin, Peters Drawn Together Under New Michigan Map, ROLL
CALL, June 17, 2011, http://www.rollcall.com/news/levin-peters-drawn-together-under-
new-michigan-map-206587-l .html. Toeplitz notes:
Veteran GOP Reps. Dave Camp, Fred Upton and Thaddeus McCotter, as well
as recently returned Rep. Tim Walberg, all saw more Republican voters moved
into their respective districts. Republicans also moved more GOP voters into
the district of freshman Rep. Dan Benishek (R) ... [And] Freshman Rep. Bill
Huizenga's (R) solidly Republican western 2nd district remains pretty much
intact under the proposed map, only acquiring the remainder of Allegan
County. Id.
27. Luke, State Democrats Want Public Input, supra note 25.
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28
around the legality of the proposed maps. Compounding the rancor of
the debate is the fact that redistricting law is one of the least settled areas
of federal law, with new holdings and interpretations emerging every
decade. That makes the outcome of any federal litigation highly
uncertain, and ensures intense debate along the way.
III. THE LAW OF REDISTRICTING IN 2011
Federal redistricting law is relatively young. For several decades,
federal courts declined to hear claims alleging wrongdoing in the
drawing of Congressional district lines, finding such claims to be
nonjusticiable and believing that the debate was best left to the political
arena. 29 That reticence began to erode with the 1962 decision of Baker v.
Carr,30 in which the Supreme Court formally entered the redistricting
fray, declaring that legal challenges to redistricting plans were permitted
under the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution. 3' During the
fifty-plus years that have followed, redistricting jurisprudence has grown
and evolved into a highly complex web of case law with the federal
courts working to strike a careful balance between the need to protect
citizens' fair representation and the inherent political interest-driven
nature of the process.
Two years after Baker, the Court established the equipopulation
principle in Reynolds v. Sims, holding that the Equal Protection Clause of
the U.S. Constitution requires a state to make an honest and good faith
effort in constructing districts that are "as nearly of equal population as is
practicable., 32 Reynolds also required that districts be redrawn following
every decennial Census to ensure that they remain equally apportioned.
Michigan law further clarifies that the state must make a good faith effort
to "achieve precise mathematical equality of population in each
district. 33
28. Kathleen Gray, Redrawn District Maps Create Uncertainty for Michigan
Democrats, DET. FREE PRESS, Aug. 21, 2011, at A10 (quoting the Chair of the Michigan
Legislative Black Caucus, Fred Durhal, as stating "The only certainty ... is that the new
maps ... will be challenged in federal court.").
29. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
30. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
31. Id. at 237 ("[w]e conclude that the complaint's allegations of a denial of equal
protection present a justiciable constitutional cause of action upon which appellants are
entitled to a trial and a decision. The right asserted is within the reach of judicial
protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.").
32. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 577 (1964).
33. MICHi. COMp. LAWS § 3.63(3)(a) (2000); see also LeRoux v. Secretary of State,
640 N.W.2d 849 (Mich. 2002).
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Michigan's Congressional District plan complies perfectly with these
equipopulation requirements.3 4 Each district has precisely 705,974
people in it, according to the 2010 Census figures.
In addition to the equipopulation requirement, the U.S. Supreme
Court has banned partisan and racial gerrymandering under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Constitution.35 But, the Court has set the bar
very high for overturning district plans under these guidelines. For
example, the Court has held that parties can allege redistricting plans to
be overly, and unconstitutionally, partisan.36 The court has yet to strike
down even the most blatantly partisan plans under this standard,37 or
devise a reliable measure of fairness for determining when partisan goals
drive the redistricting process to such an extent as to violate the U.S.
Constitution. 38 At most, the Court has suggested that a violation would
only occur where a political party is completely "denied its chance to
effectively influence the political process" in any way.39 For this reason,
while politics may have driven much of Michigan's 2011 redistricting
process, there is little reason to believe the resulting plan could be struck
down under this line of case law.
Successful claims of unconstitutional racial gerrymandering are also
rare, though not as rare as their partisan counterpart. The U.S. Supreme
Court held in Shaw v. Reno that where the shapes of districts are
"extremely irregular" it is likely that they are unconstitutional if they are
the result of "an effort to segregate the races for purposes of voting,
without regard for traditional districting principles., 40
In creating this new, "analytically distinct" cause of action under the
Equal Protection Clause, the Shaw Court reasoned,
reapportionment is one area in which appearances do matter. A
reapportionment plan that includes in one district individuals
who belong to the same race, but who are otherwise widely
separated by geographical and political boundaries, and who
34. CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT MAP, supra note 3.
35. See e.g. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U. S. 109 (1986); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630
(1993).
36. Bandemer, 478 U. S. at 111.
37. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006).
38. See, e.g., Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (Souter, J., dissenting) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
39. Bandemer 478 U. S. at 132-133.
40. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 642. For a detailed analysis of Shaw v. Reno and its
implications, see Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Harms, "Bizarre Districts, " And Voting
Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw V. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV.
483,494-497 (1993).
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may have little in common with one another but the color of their
skin, bears an uncomfortable resemblance to political apartheid.
It reinforces the perception that members of the same racial
group - regardless of their age, education, economic status, or
the community in which they live - think alike, share the same
political interests, and will prefer the same candidates at the
polls. We have rejected such perceptions . . . as impermissible
racial stereotypes.41
The opinion concluded that a citizen in an racially gerrymandered district
could state a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment if they could
feasibly allege that traditional districting principles, such as respect for
political subdivisions, compactness, and contiguity, had been set aside in
deference to considerations of the racial makeup of the district.42 The
Supreme Court clarified this issue four years later in Miller v. Johnson,
4 3
in which Justice Kennedy emphasized the permissibility of considering
racial demographics, but said that this could not be the "predominant
factor" for motivating the legislature to draw districts a certain way.
The chairman of the Michigan Democratic Party stated he believes
the districts are bizarre enough to suggest a racial gerrymander,44
Michigan legislators who voted to enact the newly drawn 14th have
generally claimed that it was drawn this way to create a majority African
American district. It is therefore feasible that a voter living in the
redrawn 14th district could state a claim that traditional districting
principles, such as respect for political subdivisions, compactness, and
contiguity, had been set aside in deference to considerations of the racial
makeup of the district.
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act bans any redistricting map that
"results in a denial or abridgment" of the right to vote on the basis of
race, color, or language-minority status.45 The Supreme Court has
41. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 647.
42. See id. at 658 ("Today we hold only that appellants have stated a claim under the
Equal Protection Clause by alleging that the North Carolina General Assembly adopted a
reapportionment scheme so irrational on its face that it can be understood only as an
effort to segregate voters into separate voting districts because of their race, and that the
separation lacks sufficient justification.").
43. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 918 (1999).
44. Peter Luke, Gov. Rick Snyder Signs Redistricting Bills Designed to Give GOP
Political Edge, MLIVE.COM (Aug. 9, 2011, 5:00 PM), http://www.mlive.com/politics/
index.ssf/2011/08/gov rick-snyder signs redistri.html.
45. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a). States with a history of pernicious racial discrimination must
receive federal approval for their redistricting plans under Section 5 of the Voting Rights
Act. In Michigan, two townships are covered under this provision: Buena Vista Township
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established three primafacie factors that must be satisfied before a court
can determine whether, under a totality of the circumstances, a Section 2
violation has occurred. These preconditions are: (1) the minority group is
"sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority"
in a single-member district; (2) the minority group is politically cohesive;
and (3) the white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it usually
to defeat the minority-preferred candidate.46  Where these three
conditions are present, the Court has generally ordered the creation of
majority-minority districts to "ensure equal political and electoral
opportunity" for minority voters to elect their candidate of choice.47
The African American community in Southeast Michigan is the only
minority community that is sufficiently large, geographically compact,
and politically cohesive in such a way as to require the creation of two
majority African American Congressional districts under Section 2.48
Accordingly, there are two districts in the Congressional map where the
Voting Age Population for African Americans is over fifty percent, thus
meeting this requirement: the Black Voting Age population (BVAP) is
55.7 1% for District 13 and 57.05% for District 14.
After meeting these federal legal requirements, the state's
Congressional district plan must also meet state mandates that require
districts be compact, contiguous, and where possible, counties and cities
be kept together in the same district. 50 These guidelines, though inscribed
by state law, are explicitly "secondary" to compliance with federal law. 1
While each Congressional district within the map is contiguous, several
leaders, including Congressman John Conyers of Detroit, questioned the
compactness of some of the aforementioned districts in southeast
Michigan. 52 Additionally, the map contains ten county and fourteen
in Saginaw County and Clyde Township in Allegan County. The state therefore must
submit the districts that encompass those townships for approval, but no others.
46. Thornburg, 478 U.S. at 50-51; see also Voinovich, 507 U.S. at 157; Growe, 507
U.S. at 40.
47. Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1019-20 (1994) (finding that the remedy for
a Section 2 violation is race-conscious districting and that, by proving their Section 2
claim, plaintiffs show that "racial and ethnic cleavages ... necessitate majority-minority
districts to ensure equal political and electoral opportunity").
48. See Testimony of Melin Hollowell, supra note 8.
49. See CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT MAP, supra note 3.
50. MICH. CoMp. LAWS § 3.63(3) (2000).
51. Id. (calling the guidelines for contiguity, compactness, and maintaining
county/city boundaries to be "secondary guidelines" and followed, "except as otherwise
required by federal law for congressional districts").
52. Jamie Edmunds, House Committee Passes Congressional Redistricting Map,
WILX.COM (Jun. 21, 2011, 5:26 PM), http://www.wilx.com/news/headlines/House_
Committee PassesCongressional RedistrictingMap_124313854.html (quoting an
[Vol. 13
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municipal splits, suggesting a potential cause of action under the
provision of state law that requires district lines to "break as few"
county, city and township boundaries "as is reasonably possible. 53 Thus
it is viable to suggest a legal claim that alleges that the newly drawn map
violates state law. But, because federal law supersedes state law, it is
permissible for the legislature to deviate from the state requirements if
they are trying to comply with the requirements of the Voting Rights Act
or the U.S. Constitution.
With these limited opportunities for legal recourse, the high cost of
pursuing litigation in state and federal court and the uncertainty of
success, it is unlikely that any group or voter will step forward to
challenge the legality of the "8 Mile Mess" and other components of the
Michigan Congressional district maps.
That does leave another possible alternative: reforming the existing
state law to take the redistricting authority away from the Legislature and
give it to an independent citizens' redistricting commission. Such a
change could give voters a meaningful voice in the redistricting process
before the districts are drawn, and potentially avoid such strangely
contorted maps in the future.
IV. AN OPPORTUNITY FOR REFORM: A CITIZENS' REDISTRICTING
COMMISSION
One striking fact behind the development of Michigan's new
Congressional districts is the lack of official input offered to voters as the
map was being drawn.5 4 And it was not for lack of interest - hundreds of
attorney for Congressman Conyers as saying, "You have the 14th district that stretches 50
miles, then in places it's at few blocks, that doesn't pass muster. Districts should be
compact and include communities of interest. These are all over the place.").
53. MicH. COMP. LAWS § 3.63(3)(c) (2000). Under the current map, the following 10
counties are split into one or more congressional districts: Mason, Allegan, Kent,
Montcalm, Saginaw, Tuscola, Washtenaw, Macomb, Oakland and Wayne. The following
14 cities and townships are also split into multiple congressional districts: Hamlin
Township, Holland, Byron Township, Greenville City, Saginaw Township, Vassar
Township, Detroit, Pittsfield, Scio Township, Rochester Hills, Sterling Heights, Clawson,
West Bloomfield Township, and Dearborn Heights. See CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT MAP,
supra note 3.
54. For example, shortly after the maps were introduced to the public, Christina Kuo,
then-executive director of Common Cause of Michigan, declared, "The public has been
completely shut out of a rigged process that will impact them long after politicians have
left the stage .... The only beneficiaries of partisan-gerrymandered districts are partisan
political operatives and the wealthy special interests they serve. The people of Michigan
will not have a voice as long as Lansing politicians shut them out of their own
democracy, as they have done with this sham of a political map." Luke, Michigan Likely
to Lose a Democrat, supra note 12.
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individuals and groups produced alternative maps through a variety of
informal methods 55 and many demonstrated other ways to comply with
federal requirements while drawing compact districts that respect county
boundaries.56
At the height of the redistricting debate in early 2011, a few efforts
to change the process at the state and local levels circulated in Lansing.
Though none were enacted, the proposed reforms also would have done
little to effectively address the central flaw in Michigan's redistricting
process: allowing politicians to choose which voters will be in their
districts.
One such debate, sponsored by Republican lawmakers from Oakland
County, Michigan sought to grant County Commissioners in Oakland
and Wayne counties the power to draw their own Commission district.
57
This change would have applied only to the state's two largest counties,
wresting redistricting power to draw county commission districts from a
committee of countywide elected officials, and giving it to the county
commissioners. Like moving the deck chairs around on the Titanic, this
plan merely would have shifted the authority from one group of
politicians to another, giving county commissioners the express authority
to draw their own districts.58
State Representative Barb Byrum, the ranking Democrat on the State
House redistricting committee, submitted a proposal that would have
required at least six statewide hearings to consider and solicit
redistricting proposals. The proposal would also require a website
posting any redistricting plans and listing any communication House
members and staff have with outside parties regarding redistricting.
5 9
While this reform would have increased the transparency of the existing
process and provided a mechanism for public input, it did not change the
fact that state legislators would be charged with selecting and enacting
their preferred plan.
Another proposal from the Democrats in the State Senate would
create an independent commission of political appointees to advise the
legislature on state and Congressional redistricting plans. 60 They claimed
the independent commission would take redistricting "outside of the
55. See e.g., Gregory Korte, Technology Allows Citizens to Be a Part of the
Redistricting Process, USA TODAY, March 11, 2011, http://www.usatoday.com/news/
washington/2011-03-21 -redistricting2 I_STN.htm?.
56. Selweski, supra note 10.
57. H.R. 4380, 96th Leg. (Mich, 2011).
58. Bruce Fealk, Republican Legislation Would Change The Rules For County
Commission Redistricting, ROCHESTER CITIZEN, Mar. 9, 2011.
59. H.R. 4557, 96th Leg. (Mich 2011)
60. H.R. 301, 96th Leg. (Mich 2011).
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politics that occur within our legislature." 61 But the proposed
commission actually wouldn't be all that independent or authoritative. It
would simply create an advisory committee comprised of appointees
from both parties and the Michigan Auditor General. There's no reason
to expect partisan appointees to act any less partisan than the legislators.
Further, the committee would lack any real authority to enact the plans
anyway, because the state legislature could still choose to accept or reject
their suggested districts.
Reforming Michigan's redistricting process is important. But none of
these proposals would have achieved the most needed change - altering
the self-interested or partisan nature of the process itself. And, it's
unlikely that any proposals coming out of the state legislature really
could.
True reform of Michigan's redistricting process will only come with
a constitutional amendment that replaces politicians with citizens and
independent experts who have a stake in preserving the fairness and
integrity of the process. Voters in states like Arizona, Iowa, and
California have led the way in this regard, enacting ballot proposals that
created true independent commissions where citizens are empowered to
draw the lines and enact redistricting plans.
In Arizona, citizens voted to amend their state constitution in 2000 to
create a five-member bi-partisan committee. 62 The state's Commission
on Appellate Court Appointments nominates ten Democrats, ten
Republicans, and five people who are not registered with either party,
and state lawmakers select four members from that pool to serve on the
Redistricting Commission. Those four then pick the fifth and final
member.
Voters in California enacted ballot proposals that created a true
independent commission where citizens are empowered to draw the lines
and enact redistricting plans.63 The procedure for assembling the
fourteen- member California Commission makes the Arizona selection
process look simple. A panel from the California State Auditor's office
selects a pool of sixty interested applicants, and legislative leaders from
both parties then have the option of eliminating twenty-four individuals
from the pool. Eight individuals are then randomly selected in a lottery
from the remaining 36 potential commissioners, and they in turn select
61. Press Release, Senate Democrats Push for Redistricting Overhaul (Mar. 21,
2011), available at http://www.senate.mi.gov/dem/Bieda/news.php.
62. See ARIZ. INDEP. REDISTRICTING COMM'N, http://www.azredistricting.org (last
visited Jan. 24, 2012).
63. See CAL. CITIZENS REDISTRICTING COMM'N, http://wedrawthelines.ca.gov (last
visited Jan. 24, 2012).
2011]
THE JOURNAL OF LAW IN SOCIETY
an additional six to serve with them on the committee. The current
fourteen-member Commission is made up of five Republicans, five
Democrats, and the remaining four are not affiliated with either party.
64
Though their structures are superior to Michigan's, the experiences
in states with independent redistricting commissions are not without their
own complications. In Arizona, Republican Governor Jan Brewer sought
unsuccessfully to have the independent chairwoman of the commission
removed, arguing that chair was "improperly conducting commission
business out of public view and of skewing the redistricting process
toward Democrats." 65 And in California, some of the state's Latino
leaders argued that the commission's State Senate map did not fairly
reflect the growing Latino population in the state,66 while the state
61Republican Party argued that the map unfairly benefited Democrats.
Nevertheless, if Michigan is to be a state where voters have a
meaningful role in drawing their congressional districts, thus creating
districts that are more likely to preserve communities with similar
interests and further the promise of effective representation, the state
should follow suit with Arizona, Iowa, and other states that have granted
citizens the power to draw their districts. The most direct and efficient
way to achieve this reform is a ballot initiative to amend our state
constitution to take the redistricting authority away from politicians and
give it to the citizens themselves. Until that reform occurs, voters will
have limited ability to influence a process that is driven primarily by
partisanship, politics, and politicians.
64. Id.
65. Marc Lacey, Arizona Governor and Senate Oust Redistricting Leader, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 2, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/02/us/chairwoman-of-arizona-
redistricting-commission-ousted.html.
66. Commission Final Senate Map Would Severely Impede Latino Political Progress,
REUTERS, Aug. 15, 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/15/idUS213206+15-
Aug-2011+PRN20110815 ("the State Senate map that would turn the clock back on
Latino political progress for the next decade. The map reduces the number of districts
where Latinos can effectively choose their elected representatives. It also significantly
weakens the voice of the Latino community in the San Fernando Valley and Orange
County."); see also. Patrick McGreevy & Richard Simon, Voting Districts Finalized
and Face Immediate Challenges, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2011.
http://articles.latimes.com/2011 /aug/15/local/la-me-redistricting-20110816.
67. Bryan Llenas, California's New Election Map Draws Fire from GOP and Latino
Groups, Fox NEWS LATINO, Aug. 16, 2011, http://Iatino.foxnews.com/latino/
politics/2011/08/16/new-califomia-redistricting-passes-but-latino-opposition-remains/#ix
zzl fBeT55Em ("The California Republican Party is already leading the way on litigation
against the commission's decision because they say it unfairly benefits Democrats.").
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V. CONCLUSION
Michigan citizens are alone in finding themselves voting in new,
strangely contorted Congressional districts after the 2011 redistricting
cycle. As politicians drawing the districts worked to comply with state
and federal law, they drew districts that furthered various partisan and
political goals instead of the interests of their constituents. Given the
limited role of the courts and judicial oversight, it is likely that this will
continue as long as elected officials maintain the power and authority to
draw these districts.
But states like California and Arizona have demonstrated ways that
an Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission can comply with the
minimal state and federal legal requirements while providing voters with
a meaningful role in the redistricting process. Amending the Michigan
state constitution to create such a commission is the best way to grant
citizens the power to draw their districts and ensure that we move closer
to achieving a Congressional District map that is compact, cohesive, and
preserves communities and interests in a way that furthers the ability for
voters to achieve effective representation in Congress.
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